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CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE LEGITIMATION OF  
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Introduction 
Along with the general intensified globalisation of social relations in contemporary 
history has come an unprecedented expansion of regulatory apparatuses that 
cover planetary jurisdictions and constituencies. On the whole, however, this 
global governance remains weak relative to pressing current needs for global 
public policy. Shortfalls in moral standing, legal foundations, material delivery, 
democratic credentials and charismatic leadership have together generated large 
legitimacy deficits in existing global regimes. This fragile overall legitimacy has in 
turn constituted a major obstacle to achieving the substantial further growth of 
global-scale regulation that is required to secure decent human lives for all in a 
more global world. Insufficient capacities for global governance and insufficient 
legitimacy of global governance are thus coupled in damaging mutual 
reinforcement. 
 
It is widely supposed – by activists, officials and academics alike – that civil 
society engagement of global regulatory institutions can do much to redress 
these shortcomings in legitimacy. On this view, civil society involvement could 
inject values and voice that bolster the moral and democratic legitimacy of global 
governance. In addition, it is posited, relations with civil society associations 
could through the provision of vital information, insights and methods enhance 
the technical performance of global governance agencies. Furthermore, civil 
society initiatives could promote the formalisation of those global governance 
activities that have operated with little or no legal frameworks. Civil society 
associations could moreover support charismatic leaders for global governance, 
albeit hopefully executive heads who follow a moral, democratic, competent and 
legal course. 
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Yet does the record fulfil these hopes and expectations? How far have civil 
society activities in practice advanced the legitimation of global regulation to 
date? What do the experiences of several decades of intensified civil society 
engagement of global governance institutions suggest regarding ways to 
enhance these legitimation effects in the future? 
 
This paper argues that – although there are of course considerable variations 
across different global governance institutions and different civil society initiatives 
– the general picture has been one of but partially realised potentials of 
legitimacy promotion. Like the tip of the proverbial iceberg, civil society activities 
concerning global regulation have so far made visible only a fraction of the total 
mass of possibilities. Hence prescriptions for the future centre on ‘more’ and 
‘better’. Regarding more quantity, urgently required greater positive legitimation 
of global governance can be promoted with more civil society engagement, 
covering more regulatory institutions and extending through more stages of the 
policy process. Regarding better quality, to have greater positive legitimation 
effects civil society relations with global governance generally need to be more 
inclusive, more competent, more coordinated, and more accountable. Both sides 
to the interchange – civil society associations on the one hand and global 
regulatory bodies on the other – can take a range of measures to further these 
ends. 
 
To develop this argument the discussion below first summarily describes the 
contemporary growth of global-scale governance institutions and their still 
inadequate proportions and legitimacy. The second section reviews the 
expansion of civil society engagement of global regulatory arrangements and the 
positive contributions (actual as well as prospective) of these activities for the 
legitimation of those regimes. The third section elaborates on shortcomings in 
current civil society relations with global governance agencies that limit positive 
legitimation effects, and offers suggestions to improve matters. 
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The thoughts presented here derive from a decade of investigations of civil 
society involvement in global governance. Much of this research has examined 
the issue-areas of finance and trade, including in particular civil society 
engagement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), 
the World Bank Group, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (O’Brien et al., 
2000; Scholte and Schnabel, 2002; Scholte, 2002, 2004). In addition, fieldwork 
on civil society and global democracy conducted across five continents between 
2001 and 2005 has encompassed a broader range of global issues and 
regulatory instruments (Scholte, 2003, forthcoming). Experiences with facilitating 
several civil society workshops on global governance and with drafting the IMF 
‘Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society Organizations’ (IMF, 2003) have also 
informed the analysis that follows. 
 
The paper is deliberately sweeping in its coverage. Much more could be said, 
and has been said elsewhere, on a number of the issues that are addressed 
more summarily here: e.g. the character of global regulation; the existence or 
otherwise of global civil society; problems of civil society accountability in global 
politics; etc. The aim of the present analysis is not to be comprehensive on any 
of these matters, but rather to distil and synthesise key points on various 
dimensions of the problem at hand in order better to grasp the relationship 
between civil society and legitimacy in global governance. 
 
To the author’s knowledge other existing research and writing has not 
consolidated such an analysis. The issue of legitimation dynamics is often 
mentioned or implied in the growing literature on civil society engagement of 
global regulatory processes, but it has never been the focal concern. Likewise, in 
official circles the recent Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United 
Nations-Civil Society Relations raised the question in passing (Cardoso, 2004: 
27-8), but did not elaborate a direct and systematic response to it. Hence it may 
be hoped that this paper helps to move the debate forward. 
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Global Governance and Its Legitimacy Gaps 
Contemporary society has become a more global society. The collective lives of 
human beings have over the past 50-60 years acquired notably larger planetary 
(that is, Earth-spanning) dimensions. This increase in transplanetary links 
between people has both material and ideational aspects. In terms of concrete 
flows, communications, travel, production, trade, money, finance, organisations, 
laws, conflicts, ecology and health now have global aspects to overall degrees 
not previously witnessed in human history (Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2005). In 
addition to such tangible links, growing global connectivity is constituted mentally 
through greater consciousness, imagination, narrative, and perception of 
planetary social spheres (Robertson, 1992). One carefully calculated multivariate 
economic, political and social measure indicates that the level of globality across 
the world rose (on a scale 0-1) from 0.23 in 1982 to 0.68 in 2004 (CSGR, 2007). 
 
Like all realms of social relations, global domains require governance, that is, the 
formulation and application of rules. Such rules may be formal or informal, strict 
or loose, permanent or transitory, public or private, enabling or oppressive. 
Whatever the character, though, regulation of some kind must develop if 
transplanetary connections among people are to have stability and longevity. 
Governance brings the degree of order and predictability needed for 
sustainability. 
 
Not surprisingly given these functional imperatives, multiple regulatory 
arrangements for planetary affairs have grown in tandem with accelerated 
globalisation in contemporary history. Preexisting global governance institutions 
have seen large increases in their mandates and resources to handle expanding 
global relations, and new global regulatory agencies have proliferated. However, 
these institutional developments have still lagged far behind the needs of global 
public policy: e.g. on arms proliferation, climate change, intercultural 
polarisations, financial crises, infectious diseases, illicit trafficking, persistent 
poverty, technology divides, and so on. The construction of effective rules and 
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regulatory processes for planetary-scale issues therefore remains a prime 
challenge for contemporary politics. 
 
Of course, not all governance of global affairs has to occur through institutions 
with a planetary scope. For one thing, contrary to some premature obituaries, 
most nation-states have substantial capacities to regulate the ways that global 
flows impact on their territories and populations. Moreover, certain major states 
(the USA above all) have global reach and play regulatory roles far beyond their 
formal frontiers. In addition, considerable regional regulation of global production, 
trade and finance has developed over the past half-century: for example, with the 
emergence of the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the East Asian 
Community (EAC), etc. Concurrently, worldwide trends of localisation have 
brought substantial devolution of much governance, including part of the 
regulation of global matters such as transnational capital investment and various 
aspects of ecological degradation. 
 
Hence the governance of global affairs is not taking shape as a global 
government, in the sense of a centralised nation-state scaled up to planetary 
proportions. Regulation of global commerce, global migration, global disease, 
and so on occurs in a diffuse fashion through multiple kinds of institutions spread 
across several scales of organisation, local to global. Theorists have variously 
referred to this condition as ‘polylateralism’, ‘networked governance’, 
‘polycentrism’, ‘empire’, ‘new medievalism’, ‘cosmocracy’, ‘mobius-web 
governance’, ‘complex sovereignty’, and ‘disaggregated world order’ (Wiseman, 
1999; Reinicke, 1999-2000; Scholte, 2000b; O’Brien et al., 2000; Hardt and 
Negri, 2000; Friedrichs, 2001; Keane, 2003; Rosenau, 2003; Grande and Pauly, 
2004; Slaughter, 2004). 
 
Thus to highlight the significance of global governance is not to posit or advocate 
the emergence of a planetary sovereign. On the contrary, there is much to be 
said on practical as well as democratic grounds for the principle of subsidiarity, 
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whereby policy decision points on global matters lie as closely as possible to the 
affected people. Yet also when one maintains that multi-scalar arrangements 
underpinned by the subsidiarity principle are the way forward for regulation of 
global issues, there still remains an urgent need today for greatly expanded 
planetary-scale governance. Even if global governance is restricted to that which 
cannot be undertaken regionally, nationally and locally, major aspects of the 
regulation of global communications, travel, production, trade, money, finance, 
conflicts, ecology and health cannot be devolved. The current requirement is 
therefore for more global governance, not less. 
 
Conventional political thought has usually equated ‘global governance’ with 
‘intergovernmental organisations’. However, other kinds of global regulatory 
apparatuses have also appeared over recent decades, in part because the 
growth of traditional multilateral institutions has not keep pace with the needs of 
rapid globalisation. As a result one might today distinguish half a dozen types of 
global governance arrangements. The most familiar form of planet-spanning 
regulatory body is indeed the formal intergovernmental agency, the old-style 
‘international organisation’. This category includes well-known entities like United 
Nations (UN) institutions, as well as less publicised bodies like la Francophonie 
and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In addition, recent 
decades have witnessed major growth of planetary-scale regulation through 
transgovernmental networks and accompanying global administrative law 
(Raustiala, 2002; Slaughter, 2004; Kingsbury and Krisch, 2006). In these cases 
senior officials from multiple states jointly pursue governance of common 
concerns with informal collaboration through memoranda of understanding, 
conferences, and day-to-day communication. Examples include the Competition 
Policy Network, the Group of Eight (G8), and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Less 
extensive to date, but potentially more important for the future, is global 
governance through interregional arrangements (Gilson, 2002; Hänggi et al., 
2005). In these cases, regulation of global issues is pursued among several 
macro-regional bodies, for example, between the EU and MERCOSUR (the 
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Southern Common Market) or ASEAN+3 (the Association of South East Asian 
Nations plus China, Japan and South Korea). Still further global regulatory 
networks have a translocal character, linking provincial and municipal 
governments across the planet in initiatives like United Cities and Local 
Governments (UCLG) and ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability. 
Meanwhile, other expansion of global governance has transpired in recent 
decades through private regulatory mechanisms run by business consortia 
and/or civil society associations (Cutler et al., 1999; Ronit and Schneider, 2000; 
Hall and Biersteker, 2003). Examples of private global governance include the 
Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC, to promote ecologically sustainable logging), 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, to advance corporate social responsibility), 
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, to elaborate and 
harmonise modes of financial reporting). A final category of growing global 
governance in contemporary history involves hybrid arrangements that combine 
public and private elements (Bull and McNeill, 2007). Examples include the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN, started in 1998), 
the Global Compact (launched in 2000) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (established in 2002). 
 
Appreciated in this multifaceted way, considerably more global governance has 
developed over recent decades than is suggested by looking at 
intergovernmental multilateralism alone. Accounts of global governance 
particularly tend to underestimate, or overlook altogether, the substantial 
contemporary significance of transgovernmental networks and private global 
regulation. In addition, interregionalism, translocalism and public-private hybrids 
are important in certain areas and may become major forms of global regulation 
in the years to come. 
 
Yet for all of this institutional innovation and expansion, global governance today 
still falls far short of needs. Much more and much better transplanetary regulation 
is needed to ensure that globalisation impacts positively on core attributes of a 
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good society such as cultural vibrancy, democracy, distributive justice, ecological 
integrity, material well-being and peace. 
 
Nor can major breakthroughs to larger and more effective global governance be 
expected in the absence of greater legitimacy for planetary regulation. Such 
global governance apparatuses as have developed so far generally lack firmly 
rooted support from those whom they govern (Zürn, 2005; Buchanan and 
Keohane, 2006). Indeed, frequently the persons subject to a given global 
regulatory arrangement are not even aware that it exists. Where the affected 
publics are cognizant of a global governance apparatus, they generally do not 
actively endorse it and often feel at best only a limited obligation to acknowledge 
its authority. 
 
A governance framework can derive legitimacy from several sources, especially 
the five qualities of morality, legality, technical competence, democracy and 
charismatic leadership. With respect to morality, fair trade schemes with their 
explicit orientation to distributive justice generally enjoy greater legitimacy with 
global publics than the WTO. With respect to legality, grounding in international 
law tends to give the UN greater legitimacy than the informal G8. With respect to 
technical performance, the achievements of the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) in promoting education and health of young persons bring that agency 
substantial public endorsement, whereas the legitimacy of the IMF has suffered 
from various failings of the macroeconomic adjustment policies that it has 
promoted. With respect to democracy, comprehensive direct stakeholder 
participation and accountability arguably secures the FSC more legitimacy than 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). With respect to charisma, 
James Wolfensohn by his person arguably bolstered public support for the World 
Bank at a time of considerable challenge, while the success of the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) in global regulation of the internet owes largely to the 
inspiration of Tim Berners-Lee. 
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The dynamics of legitimation are of course more complex than an artificially neat 
analytical distinction of five sources may suggest. In practice the different 
aspects of legitimacy are often overlapping and mutually reinforcing, so that it is 
difficult to specify how much of each strand is in play. For instance, much 
promotion of global human rights (enhancing moral standing) has occurred in 
tandem with giving voice to subordinated groups like indigenous peoples and 
women (enhancing democratic standing). On other occasions several sources of 
legitimacy can also be in tension. For example, much transgovernmental 
regulation is marked by (legitimating) strong technical efficacy and 
(delegitimating) weak legality. Other times prevailing global law may violate the 
moral sensibilities of substantial populations, say, on religious grounds. 
 
These complexities duly noted, however, there can be little dispute that the 
overall current balance sheet for the legitimacy of global governance stands 
deeply in the red. Moral foundations, legal grounding, material delivery, 
democratic practice and charismatic leadership are sooner weak than strong in 
transplanetary regulation today. Again, this problem is critical: without greater 
legitimacy, global governance will not obtain the greater resources and powers 
that are needed to make the required major regulatory advances. 
 
The Legitimating Potentials of Global Civil Society 
Arguably civil society involvement in global governance can do much to address 
these legitimacy deficits. The following pages clarify how ‘civil society’ is 
understood in the present context and identify broad ways that globally oriented 
civil society activities can have legitimating effects on global governance. Before 
proceeding further, however, four qualifications are suitably inserted at this 
juncture. 
 
First, the emphasis in the current discussion on civil society promotion of 
legitimate global governance does not deny the important contributions that can 
come from other quarters as well. For example, national and local governments, 
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parliaments and political parties, the mass media, and business circles can also 
help to give firmer moral, legal, technical, democratic and/or charismatic qualities 
to global governance. The argument advanced here is not that civil society is the 
sole or even primary provider of legitimacy for global governance, but rather that 
civil society is a significant force whose potential fruits have thus far been 
inadequately nurtured. The roles of other players in legitimising global 
governance can be assessed in other writings (e.g. Scholte, 2006). 
 
Second, the present argument does not presume that civil society activities in 
respect of global governance are inherently legitimating. On the contrary, 
interventions from civil society can often delegitimate global authorities by 
exposing immorality, illegality, incompetence and authoritarianism and in their 
quarters. The role of civil society is therefore one of vigilant monitoring rather 
than uncritical endorsement of global governance. One might hope that this 
accountability function of civil society would encourage global regulators to 
correct mistakes and bolster their legitimacy. However, the effect may also be to 
increase public awareness of malfeasance in global governance and thereby – 
often justifiably – to weaken its legitimacy. 
 
Third, civil society associations themselves are not intrinsically legitimate. These 
citizen groups, too, can suffer from unethical conduct, illegality, ignorance, 
undemocratic behaviour and ossified leadership (Ahrne, 1998). Indeed, a number 
of the suggestions for future improvements that are developed towards the end 
of this paper focus on upgrading the performance of civil society activities. Hence 
the approach taken here is not one of uncritical enthusiasm for civil society, but a 
measured assessment of opportunities that this citizen action offers to enhance 
legitimate global governance. 
 
A fourth key qualification is that the present argument does not advocate 
legitimacy in global governance at all costs. In principle legitimacy can bring 
positive results, as it generally permits regulation to occur more energetically, 
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efficiently and nonviolently. Yet it would hardly be desirable to have global 
governance that enjoyed overall public support but presided over, say, genocide 
or ecological ruin. Nor is the goal to achieve hegemonic legitimacy in a 
Gramscian sense, where the subjects of global governance are persuaded that 
the rules operate in their interest when the regime in fact oppresses them. 
However, legitimacy accorded to global governance by critically aware and 
actively mobilised citizens can help these regulatory apparatuses to thrive and 
produce positive results. 
 
What then, more specifically, is meant by (global) civil society in the present 
context? This circumscribed paper is not the place to assess the multiple 
contending conceptions of civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Kaldor, 2003; 
Edwards, 2004), or to elaborate an intellectual and political justification for the 
particular definition adopted here (Scholte, forthcoming). It can simply be 
affirmed that civil society is understood in this analysis to be a political arena 
where associations of citizens seek, from outside political parties, to shape the 
rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life. Civil society activities are 
an enactment of citizenship, that is, practices through which people claim rights 
and fulfil responsibilities as members of a given polity. These initiatives are also 
collective, involving citizens assembled in groups that share concerns about, and 
mobilise around, a particular problem of public affairs. As self-consciously 
political actions, civil society operations are steeped in struggles to affect the 
ways that power in society is acquired, distributed and exercised. However, civil 
society efforts to shape governance do not – in the way of political parties – aim 
to attain or retain public office. 
 
Modern political theory has normally described and explained civil society in 
relation to the state. Under a statist conception the rules that civil society 
initiatives seek to shape are those that emanate from national (and within it local) 
government. Likewise, in this conventional perspective the citizenship that civil 
society activities enact is centred on and defined by the state. The civil society 
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associations that engage the state are based in its territory and regulated under 
its laws. From the perspective of statist political theory, the notion of ‘global civil 
society’ appears to be an oxymoron. 
 
Yet the key point is not that civil society relates to the state, but that it relates to a 
governance apparatus. When, as in the past, governance operated in a statist 
mode, with a near-complete focus on sovereign national territorial governments, 
civil society likewise concentrated on the state. However, as indicated earlier, 
regulation today involves many more institutional sites in addition to the nation-
state, including a host of arrangements with a global scope. Not surprisingly, civil 
society associations have in line with this shift in the overall mode of governance 
also shifted their points of engagement. Thus, observing that many societal rules 
now emanate to a significant degree from global governance agencies of the 
various types described earlier, citizen action groups have in recent decades 
reoriented their activities partly towards those transplanetary regimes. This 
engagement of global governance institutions – together with attention to global 
issues, adoption of global organisational frameworks, use of global 
infrastructures, resources from global finance, and support from global 
solidarities among people – makes talk of ‘global civil society’ quite meaningful 
(Scholte, 2000a). 
 
Indeed, civil society activities are pervasive in contemporary global governance 
(Florini, 2000; Edwards and Gaventa, 2001; GCS, 2001–; Clark, 2003; Batliwala 
and Brown, 2006). Parallel NGO Forums alongside UN-sponsored global issue 
conferences are one highly visible manifestation of this engagement. In addition, 
civil society is also involved in transgovernmental processes like the G8 and 
interregional processes like the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM). In some cases of 
private global governance like the FSC and fair trade schemes it is civil society 
associations themselves that formulate and administer the rules. Among the 
public-private hybrids civil society associations have actively campaigned in 
respect of ICANN and sat on the board of the Global Fund. 
 13
 
The civil society associations that engage global governance institutions take 
many forms. Some are nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), that is, issue-
based nonprofit agencies with a formal organisation, legal personality and 
professional staff. Many (albeit far from all) citizen initiatives on consumer 
problems, democracy promotion, development cooperation, environmental 
degradation, health, human rights, humanitarian relief, market regulation, the 
status of women, and youth questions are largely pursued through NGOs. Other 
civil society activities vis-à-vis global governance occur through social 
movements involving large, often informally organised, and sometimes even 
underground mobilisations of non-professional activists. Examples include many 
citizen actions on animal rights, caste discrimination, indigenous peoples, land 
tenure, peace, racial solidarity, religious belief, and working conditions. Thus the 
civil society that is relevant to global governance extends far wider than the 
transnational NGOs who cluster around Geneva, New York and Washington. 
 
Civil society initiatives in respect of global governance also vary widely in other 
respects. In terms of size, for example, tens of thousands may gather around a 
G8 summit, while other actions involved handfuls of people. In terms of duration, 
the Anti-Slavery Society has several centuries behind it, while other NGOs are 
‘come-and-gos’. In terms of geographical scope, the campaign to ban land mines 
spanned all inhabited continents, while civil society actions on the use of debt 
relief monies can be highly localised. In terms of cultural context, many global 
civil society activities are steeped in western modernity, while others involve the 
assertion of indigenous life-worlds or religious revivalism. In terms of resource 
levels, Amnesty International and Greenpeace can draw on large funds and the 
most sophisticated technology, while the peasants of Vía Campesina often lack 
even their own land. In terms of constituencies, civil society interventions in 
global governance may advocate for anyone from multinational companies to the 
mentally ill. In terms of broad strategies, global civil society houses everything 
from the neoliberalism of the Cato Institute to the Trotskyism of the Fourth 
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International. In terms of tactics, some parts of civil society will don establishment 
attire for face-to-face meetings in the offices of global governance agencies, 
while other citizen activists steadfastly refuse any direct contact with global 
authorities. 
 
All of this diverse civil society activity can in principle significantly advance the 
legitimation of global governance on the several grounds discussed earlier. For 
example, with regard to legitimation on the basis of moral stature, many civil 
society associations have donned the mantle of ‘conscience of the world’ in 
respect of global governance institutions (Willetts, 1996). In this vein citizen 
group initiatives have prodded the transplanetary regulatory agencies to promote 
righteous ends like decolonisation, human rights, poverty eradication, fair trade, 
anti-corruption, peace, and ecological sustainability. Pressures from civil society 
have figured centrally in the development of countless global governance policies 
with a pronounced moral dimension, including sanctions against the former 
apartheid regime in South Africa, measures to advance gender equality, the 
Millennium Development Goals, the rescheduling and eventual cancellation of 
many poor-country debts, the Kimberley Process against so-called ‘blood 
diamonds’, initiatives to protect biological diversity, and so on. Conversely, civil 
society interventions have at other times undermined the legitimacy of global 
governance by highlighting purported moral flaws, for instance, with charges that 
policies of the WTO deepened social injustice. True, as noted earlier, civil society 
also houses ‘uncivil’ groups of fundamentalists, militarists, racists and ultra-
nationalists; so its interventions in global governance do not always and 
inherently carry positive moral effect. However, one does not have to romanticise 
civil society to observe that these activities have on various occasions played a 
pivotal role in persuading global regulatory authorities to champion good causes. 
Public perceptions of the moral credibility of various forms of transplanetary 
regulation have then risen in consequence. 
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Civil society energies have also in different contexts helped to generate 
legitimation (and delegitimation) of global governance in relation to legality. 
Advocacy by citizen groups has figured centrally in the formulation and 
ratification of countless treaties and resolutions with global legal force. Already in 
the 1940s, civil society inputs were instrumental in promoting the San Francisco 
Charter that set up the UN. Half a century later, civil society figured prominently 
(especially through the World Economic Forum) in launching the Uruguay Round 
that delivered the WTO in 1995. Likewise, the entry into force of the Convention 
to Prohibit Anti-Personnel Mines in 1999 and the creation of the International 
Criminal Court in 2002 resulted in good part from civil society campaigns. 
Conversely, civil society associations have questioned the legitimacy of some 
global governance by highlighting weak legal groundings, for example, in relation 
to transgovernmental processes like the G8 and certain private global 
governance mechanisms like instruments for corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Similarly, several million street demonstrators in February 2003 
undermined the legitimacy of a forthcoming invasion of Iraq that lacked full and 
specific legal sanction under the United Nations. 
 
From a third angle, civil society associations have often contributed to the 
legitimation of transplanetary regulation by abetting the successful delivery of 
material objectives. Competent inputs from civil society can enhance policy 
development and operational work in global governance. Civil society groups can 
inject valuable information, insights, methods and advice into policy processes. 
Sometimes these data and perspectives replicate, confirm, reinforce and 
strengthen existing policy knowledge. On other occasions civil society 
interventions prompt adjustments to policy, for example, by bringing the latest 
news fresh from the field or by providing alternative views from quarters that 
official circles do not readily access. Challenges from civil society quarters to 
established policy can provoke a global governance agency to sharpen its 
thinking and improve its instruments. Engagement with civil society can also 
provide global regulatory institutions with an important gauge of the political 
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viability or otherwise of a given project or programme. In certain situations civil 
society actors moreover themselves perform global regulation. For example, they 
may hold formal positions in transplanetary governance mechanisms, e.g., as 
members of the Board of the Global Fund, as parties to the FSC, and as 
supervisors of fair trade schemes. In addition, some global governance bodies 
subcontract parts of their operations to civil society agencies, particularly in 
situations where the citizen groups can perform the services in question more 
effectively than official bureaucracies. Needless to say, where civil society inputs 
undermine material delivery – e.g. with faulty information or flawed performance 
– they sooner contribute to a delegitimation of global governance. 
 
Still another way that civil society activities can raise the legitimacy (or 
conversely emphasise the illegitimacy) of transplanetary regimes relates to 
democracy. From this fourth angle global governance can be legitimate when – 
along with, or in some cases instead of, morality, legality, material delivery and 
charismatic leadership – it rests on participation by and accountability to the 
affected public(s). Civil society can promote ‘rule by the people’ in global 
governance in at least seven complementary ways (Scholte, 2003, forthcoming). 
For one thing, civil society associations can contribute significantly to public 
education about global governance, thereby empowering citizens to involve 
themselves meaningfully in these regulatory processes. Second, civil society 
interventions can stimulate public debate about current and possible future 
courses of global governance, thereby fuelling the active critical deliberations that 
lie at the heart of a vibrant democracy. Third, civil society groups can connect 
citizens directly to global governance authorities, through consultation exercises 
and the like. Fourth, civil society pressures can induce global governance 
authorities to be more open, visible and transparent about their operations, so 
that citizens are able to intervene more effectively in policy processes. Fifth, civil 
society organisations can serve a watchdog role that extracts greater public 
accountability from global regulatory agencies for their actions and omissions. 
Sixth, civil society actions can counter the various arbitrary social hierarchies 
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(inter alia on lines of age, class, culture, gender, geography and race) that 
prevent citizens from having adequate and equal opportunities to shape global 
governance. Seventh, civil society initiatives can provide recognition and voice 
for political identities (for example, of indigenous peoples, religious revivalists 
and sexual minorities) that tend generally to be undemocratically marginalised 
and silenced in global politics. Of course, civil society can and does also fail to 
realise these democratising possibilities vis-à-vis global governance. In some 
cases civil society groups even exacerbate failings of global democracy through 
shortfalls of participatory and accountable practices in their own quarters. So civil 
society’s democratic impacts on global governance are potential rather than 
automatic, but many positive effects of this kind have been had, and many more 
could be obtained. 
 
Finally, civil society activities can promote legitimacy in global governance by 
promoting charismatic leadership of these regulatory institutions. As noted 
earlier, transplanetary regulation has, in contrast to contemporary national 
government, not usually sought or secured much legitimacy on the basis of the 
popular appeal of its executives. The norm at the head of these organisations 
has sooner been relatively faceless technocrats, and civil society groups have for 
the most part not challenged this tendency. That said, civil society associations 
themselves have inserted into global politics some charismatic personalities who 
have helped to draw media and popular attention to pressing issues of 
transplanetary regulation. Examples include José Bové, the Dalai Lama, Wangari 
Maathai, and Comandante Marcos. 
 
Across all five main dimensions, then, civil society can do much to bolster – or 
where warranted to undermine – the legitimacy of global governance. True, civil 
society activities are not the only source of such legitimation; nor are civil society 
groups always sufficiently legitimate in their own right. Nevertheless, civil society 
houses some of the most powerful forces available today for the badly needed 
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greater legitimation of global governance. Hence the final part of this discussion 
turns to steps that could bring a fuller realisation of the possibilities. 
 
Global regulatory agencies have broadly (if sometimes rather belatedly and 
reluctantly) recognised the legitimising potentials of relations with civil society. As 
a result, most have over recent decades pursued notable initiatives to engage 
these citizen associations. In several cases civil society groups have actually 
held seats on global policymaking bodies like ICANN committees and the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development. Since the mid-1990s many 
governments have added civil society practitioners onto their official delegations 
to global governance congresses. Sometimes (as in the 1990 Jomtien 
Conference on Education for All and the 2002 Monterrey Conference on 
Financing for Development) civil society attendees have taken the floor in their 
own capacity alongside state officials. Almost all global governance agencies 
have institutionalised some kind of mechanisms for civil society consultation. 
Even the UN Security Council has since the late 1990s permitted occasional 
informal briefings by civil society organisations under the so-called ‘Arria 
formula’. A number of global regulatory agencies have appointed specially 
designated civil society liaison officers. Several including the IMF, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank have also 
prepared written staff guides for relations with civil society actors. A few 
multilaterals have furthermore introduced staff training courses on the subject. 
Most of these steps to ‘open up’ to civil society were barely conceivable thirty 
years ago. 
 
Global governance agencies have often presented such measures as 
‘concessions’ to civil society pressures, but the benefits and dependencies are 
usually mutual. Thus the UN needs its civil society ‘partners’ (to lend it moral 
authority, technical support, and greater trappings of democracy) as much as 
vice versa. Global economic institutions need to have at least some influential 
civil society associations inside the tent at least some of the time, rather than 
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always and only to face civil society opposition outside. In contrast to 
transplanetary governance arrangements created before the 1990s, recent 
additions like the Global Compact and the Global Fund have tended to build in a 
significant civil society component from the outset. The 1994 Marrakech 
Agreement that founded the WTO also explicitly provides for relations with civil 
society. 
 
Critics may enquire sceptically what kind of legitimation results from such civil 
society engagement with global governance. Do these relationships veritably 
enhance the moral, legal, technical, democratic and/or charismatic qualities of 
transplanetary regulation? Or do the overtures from official quarters to civil 
society amount to a hegemonic disciplining and cooptation of dissent, whereby a 
surface legitimation disguises and suppresses a deeper illegitimacy? 
 
Answers to these questions can go either way, depending partly on concrete 
evidence relating to specific contexts and partly on the theoretical and political 
predispositions of the questioner. Certainly substantial cases can be developed 
either for optimistic liberal and Polanyian readings of the situation (e.g. Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Munck, 2006) or for critical Gramscian and poststructuralist 
assessments (e.g. Gill, 2003; Hardt and Negri, 2004). However, commentators of 
all persuasions would affirm (albeit in different ways) a need for better civil 
society legitimation of global rules. 
 
Towards the Future 
What could be done to improve the legitimation dynamics of civil society relations 
with global governance institutions? What steps are advisable both to increase 
the interchanges and to generate a positive rather than a hegemonic legitimation 
of global regulation? In a word, what is wanted in the period ahead is more, more 
inclusive, more competent, more coordinated, and more accountable civil society 
engagement at the heart of policy processes of the full range of global 
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governance processes. The remainder of this paper elaborates on these broad 
needs in turn. 
 
More relations 
 
In the first place, then, greater and better legitimation of global governance can 
be obtained through sheer increases in civil society engagement of the regimes 
in question. Important though the relations to date have been, the scale could be 
substantially larger. On the one hand, more civil society associations could direct 
more of their work towards questions of global governance. At present the circle 
of serious engagers remains relatively small. On the other hand, more 
transplanetary regulatory agencies could nurture more exchanges with civil 
society groups. Important though a number of global governance initiatives in this 
area have been, the overall scale thus far remains relatively modest. 
 
It is also important that civil society efforts on global governance better cover the 
full range of relevant institutions. Current civil society attentions are 
disproportionately concentrated on the older generation of intergovernmental 
agencies and remain comparatively neglectful of newer arrangements like 
transgovernmental networks and private governance instruments that generally 
suffer greater legitimacy deficits. Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that civil 
society engagement offers one of the best ways to enhance justice in respect of 
transgovernmental regulation (2004: 220-1, 240). Yet to date few citizen 
associations have taken up this challenge, apart from sporadic attention to the 
G8. Likewise, key private global governance arrangements in areas like 
communications and finance have so far usually stayed off the civil society 
campaign map, again limiting important prospective (de)legitimation effects. 
 
Indeed, civil society associations should arguably construct future advocacy 
more in terms of issues than in regard to specific institutions. As seen earlier, a 
global problem tends to be regulated through a diffuse, trans-scalar, multi-actor 
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complex, rather than in a centralised fashion through a single agency. Thus, for 
example, civil society initiatives would better engage the polycentric network that 
governs global trade rather than direct efforts at the WTO alone. Likewise, it is a 
multifaceted regulatory apparatus that matters for global ecological affairs rather 
than CSR, the FSC or UNEP per se. The notable impacts of civil society 
campaigns on debt relief and women’s rights have resulted partly from a strategy 
of engaging the overall relevant governance framework instead of just one or the 
other institutional node. 
 
Yet wherever in global governance civil society associations engage, greater 
positive legitimation effects could result if these citizen inputs were integrated 
more into the whole policy processes, starting from initial agenda setting and 
continuing all the way through to retrospective evaluation. In many cases global 
regulatory agencies have mainly limited civil society involvement to later stages 
of policy formulation, after the principal decisions have been taken. Official circles 
then expect ‘consultation’ of civil society to give a veneer of public endorsement 
to policy that has in effect already been decided. Even when civil society inputs 
are incorporated earlier – as in the preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) for low-income countries – governance authorities often do not 
adopt the kind of open, respectful, listening, learning attitudes to citizen groups 
that would allow maximum policy enhancement to be taken from these 
exchanges. 
 
True, global governance staffs have several understandable grounds for caution 
about possible delegitimating effects of bringing civil society actors too far into 
policy processes. For example, official circles may require degrees of 
confidentiality when (as in cases such as interest rate adjustments and troop 
deployments) disclosure to civil society circles could compromise policy 
effectiveness. Likewise, global regulatory bodies might need to tread carefully 
when exchanges with civil society actors could disrupt their relations with 
legitimate governments. In addition, transplanetary governance agencies might 
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want to curtail contacts with civil society associations when the global institutions 
could thereby become unhelpfully embroiled in the political struggles of others 
(election campaigns, ethnic conflicts, etc.). Furthermore, official circles may worry 
about becoming unwittingly involved with ‘uncivil’ society, particularly in situations 
where they can get only limited information about the groups. 
 
Yet global authorities sometimes also overplay such cautions as a way to evade 
the challenges of deeper dialogue with civil society. Similarly, complaints of a 
lack of time for civil society outreach are often heard somewhat too quickly and 
insistently from officials who prefer to avoid this added complication to their work. 
Most global governance agencies could substantially expand relations with 
citizen groups without encountering major problems of confidentiality, 
unconstructive political exposure and overworked staff. 
 
More inclusive relations 
 
At the same time as increasing the quantity of relations between civil society and 
global governance, an enhancement of this legitimation dynamic also requires 
substantial improvements in the quality of these interchanges. A key step in this 
regard is to develop more inclusive interchanges that encompass the whole of 
society, including in particular marginalised and subordinated people. 
 
To date the ‘civil society’ that engages global regulatory institutions has on the 
whole disproportionately involved limited and structurally privileged sectors of 
humanity. Past exchanges have especially favoured a global elite of culturally 
western, university-educated, English-speaking professionals. In the process 
many other citizen voices have been sidelined. As a result, patterns of civil 
society relations with global governance have generally reproduced the arbitrary 
inequalities of society at large. Civil society access to global governance has 
been predominantly Northern, urban, wealthy, male-led, and white – and 
moreover has often excluded non-western cultures, disabled persons, youth, 
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lower castes and sexual minorities. To this extent there are substantial grounds 
to speak of hegemonic legitimation processes in which diversity and dissent are 
suppressed (however subtly and in many cases also unintentionally). 
 
To counter these exclusionary tendencies both sides – civil society actors as well 
as global regulatory institutions – need to make far more proactive efforts at 
wider involvement than witnessed so far. A laissez-faire approach to civil society 
engagement of global governance invariably leads, as in any ‘free market’, to an 
overwhelming dominance of the strong. A positive development of the past 
decade has seen the growth of a rhetoric of inclusion in global politics, 
particularly in respect of ‘the South’, ‘the grassroots’, and ‘gender 
mainstreaming’. However, in practice the prevailing pattern remains for better 
resourced and more forceful North-based professional advocates (more often 
than not men) to speak in global governance quarters instead of (and sometimes 
purportedly for) South-based and otherwise marginalised constituencies. Much 
more sustained deliberate actions are needed to advance equality of opportunity 
to enter civil society relations with global governance. In order to attain more 
tenable legitimacy, global regulatory bodies need more vigorously to embrace 
diversity and connect through civil society with the whole of an incipient global 
polity: peripheries as well as metropoles; small enterprises as well as big capital; 
peasants as well as agribusiness; informal workers as well as mainstream labour 
unions; religious revivalists as well as secularists; indigenous cultures as well as 
modernists; young persons as well as older adults; people of colour as well as 
whites; the disabled as well as the able-bodied; lgbt circles as well as 
heterosexuals; lower as well as upper castes. 
 
In particular this more inclusive orientation requires a conception that does not – 
as most global governance agencies currently tend to do – equate civil society 
with NGOs. Global regulatory authorities generally find it more comfortable and 
convenient to identify civil society activities in ways that they readily understand 
and more easily engage. NGOs present a relatively known quantity, in the sense 
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of being modern, formal, legal, bureaucratic, compact, professional organisations 
– usually also with English-speaking staff. In these broad structural terms NGOs 
are quite similar to global regulatory bodies. For all that the two sets of actors 
may have heated disagreements over some policy questions, they tend to 
embody similar kinds of social exclusions. Indeed, many subordinated circles 
(including, for example, some faith groups, indigenous peoples, landless 
peasants, disaffected youth, and slum dwellers) find the NGO form to be 
culturally alien and – for their purposes – politically ineffective. These 
constituencies frequently prefer social movement modes of action: more informal, 
diffuse, fluid, populous, horizontal and spontaneous (Eschle and Maiguascha, 
2005; Della Porta, 2006). Thus to achieve greater inclusion – and thereby deeper 
legitimacy – global governance institutions must give far more attention to 
devising means to relate to non-NGO expressions of civil society. 
 
Meanwhile NGOs themselves could in general also pursue greater efforts to 
develop better understandings of and communications with social movements on 
global governance issues. Some NGOs have nurtured substantial links of this 
kind, including organisations like the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic 
Analysis (IBASE), Focus on the Global South, and NGOs supporting the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Since 2001 the World 
Social Forum has also provided a constructive meeting ground for NGOs and 
social movements. However, most NGO interlocutors with global regulatory 
agencies rarely trade elite corridors for squatter camps. In Geneva and 
Washington the civil society world is sooner CNN than Franz Fanon. 
 
One way to counter this NGO inbreeding with official power is to encourage more 
rotation of the civil society actors who enter dialogue with global governance 
agencies. True, as is elaborated under the next heading, an enhanced 
legitimation dynamic also wants the greater competence that is born of 
experience, which implies a certain continuity of personalities. However, as in 
any other vocation, too much continuity of personnel in civil society relations with 
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global governance can lessen capacities to deliver new information, critical 
analysis, alternative worldviews, and out-of-the-box advice. Civil society 
careerists ensconced in Brussels and New York can sometimes jealously guard 
their privileged access to global policy processes. In the worst cases a tired civil 
society establishment may counterproductively obstruct the entry of energetic 
newcomers who could reinvigorate moral sensibilities, convey the latest technical 
advances, and inject wider democratic voice. Civil society offers veritable 
legitimation at the global governance table not by cooptatively warming up the 
seats, but by counter-hegemonically heating up the proceedings. 
 
More competent relations 
 
Along with wider inclusion, relations between civil society associations and global 
governance institutions need to be marked by ample mutual comprehension if 
the interchanges are fully to realise their potentials to advance legitimation. Both 
sides include parties who have impressive information and insight about the 
other, but overall the current picture is often marked by considerable ignorance. 
Thus a major requirement for greater legitimation of global governance through 
relations with civil society is improved competence on the part of activists and 
officials alike to deal with one another. 
 
Global governance institutions could implement various measures to this end. 
For one thing, all global regulatory bodies could follow the example of UNDP and 
the World Bank in appointing experienced specialists to run their civil society 
bureaux. A number of other agencies have allocated these tasks to generalists 
who have no particular expertise regarding citizen action groups. Likewise, global 
governance institutions could suitably emphasise disposition towards and 
experience in outreach to civil society when they select positions (like heads of 
country offices) where these contacts are especially important. 
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Meanwhile, for the benefit of global governance staff in general, written 
guidelines for civil society liaison could be prepared for those regulatory agencies 
that so far lack such an explicit framework. Moreover, all such texts could be 
given operational effect, as opposed to being merely optional reference material. 
Building on these documents, global regulatory bodies could offer their staff 
systematic training on relations with civil society organisations. Few of these 
agencies at present provide such support, instead leaving the conduct of civil 
society liaison largely to the staff’s intuitions. Backed by operational guidelines 
and training, staff performance reviews could then reasonably include effective 
civil society liaison as one of the assessment criteria, thereby introducing a direct 
link between achievements in this area and personal career progress. 
 
Other administrative routines, too, could be altered to enhance global 
governance outreach to civil society. For example, institutions can amend the pro 
forma for policy documentation (e.g. programme strategy papers, back-to-office 
reports, retrospective evaluations) to include a specific heading on relations with 
civil society. Officials could thereby be encouraged to do more to fill in the 
relevant boxes. In addition, global governance institutions would generally benefit 
from keeping more systematic and up-to-date records of contacts in civil society. 
Often departing officials leave their successors very few and poorly kept files on 
this subject, thereby compelling each newcomer to develop links with civil society 
largely from scratch. 
 
On the side of civil society, improved competence on engagement of global 
governance often requires that campaigners stay the course on specific issues 
and institutions. Some civil society organisations have through long-term 
sustained efforts developed a deep engagement regarding certain agencies and 
areas of global regulation. Illustrative examples include the Southern and Eastern 
African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) and the Japan 
Center for International Finance (JCIF). However, many civil society initiatives fail 
to acquire sufficient depth on any policy area, following the caprice of headlines 
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and sponsors to flit from one global governance problem to the next. In this way 
civil society herds have moved from debt to trade, from trade to war, from war to 
CSR, and so on. 
 
Much as global governance officials require training in respect of civil society, 
citizen activists for their part also generally need more capacity enhancement in 
respect of transplanetary regulation. Even advocates with university degrees 
often lack sufficient information and analytical tools to map global governance 
processes and the power dynamics that shape global policies. The current 
emergence of university courses on global public policy can help to deepen 
future civil society competence, particularly in NGOs. In addition, however, 
greater activist education through ‘popular universities’ of the kind found in Brazil 
and Scandinavia is needed to raise capacities in social movements that 
campaign on global governance issues. 
 
Along with upgraded conceptual insight, civil society campaigners on global 
governance issues often also need a sharper strategic orientation. Even many 
veteran activists have not systematically and explicitly thought through the 
underlying values and overarching visions that motivate their engagement. The 
World Social Forum initiative has been helpful in highlighting issues of overall 
strategy, and several texts on globalisation and its governance (e.g. Klein, 2000; 
Bello, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002) have served a manifesto-like purpose for some civil 
society practitioners. However, most citizen activists have not carefully and 
precisely identified what they find lacking in currently prevailing policy paradigms, 
let alone how more specifically they would reconstruct those strategic 
frameworks. In short, civil society efforts to promote more legitimate global 
governance are hampered to the extent that the advocates lack a clear 
conception of what, beyond the issue immediately at hand, they are advocating. 
 
Increased civil society competence can also be pursued in respect of campaign 
tactics. True, the effectiveness of citizen group initiatives on global governance is 
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often highly constrained by limited resources. The best devised action plans are 
naught without sufficient people, equipment and money to execute them. Thus 
more – and more reliable – resourcing of civil society engagement of 
transplanetary governance is an obvious priority for the future. A chronic lack of 
means has led too many able campaigners to abandon their efforts in despair. 
 
That said, improved tactics can also make limited resources go further. One key 
step in this direction is discussed at greater length below: namely, better 
coordination of civil society initiatives regarding global regulation. In addition, civil 
society groups working on global governance could generally do more to exploit 
the possibilities of mobilising constituents through the Internet and other mass 
media. More cleverly still, citizen advocates can pursue emancipatory causes in 
ways that harness hegemonic forces and their superior resources. For example, 
the civil society campaign for access to essential medicines has prompted global 
capitalists to question and qualify the existing regime of intellectual property 
rights. Similarly, poorly resourced movements of Dalit women, indigenous 
peoples and other subordinated groups have been able to turn the hegemonic 
global human rights regime to their advantage. 
 
As these examples show, civil society associations can draw on rich past 
experiences to further their campaigns for more legitimate global governance. 
What is generally lacking, however, are effective mechanisms for sharing of, and 
mutual learning from, this accumulated competence. True, various research 
projects have documented the successes and failures of a number of civil society 
initiatives on matters of global regulation. Arguably civil society associations 
could make much more and better use of publications like the Global Civil 
Society Yearbook (GCS, 2001–), studies on civil society engagement of global 
governance agencies commissioned by the Montreal International Forum (FIM, 
2007), reports prepared through the North-South Institute (NSI, 2007), and a 
number of edited collections and monographs (Willetts, 1996; Fox and Brown, 
1998; Florini, 2000; Edwards and Gaventa, 2001; Scholte and Schnabel, 2002; 
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Clark, 2003; Martens, 2005). Likewise, the fruitful collaborations nurtured over 
the past decade between campaigners and researchers on global governance 
would helpfully be much expanded and deepened (Brown et al., 2001). 
 
Alongside academic research, more could also be done for capacity 
development through civil society conferences and workshops where activists 
engaged with questions of global governance can productively exchange 
experiences across issues, institutions and campaigns. However, these costly 
gatherings are per force rare and involve only limited numbers of advocates. 
Complementary efforts might therefore be dedicated to developing a permanent 
resource centre for civil society initiatives on global governance. Such an institute 
could provide activists with services such as: assembling records of previous 
campaigns on global governance questions; mapping networks of regulation and 
power in relation to different global issues; translating important civil society and 
global governance documents into relevant languages; and acting as an 
incubator for new ideas and programmes on collective citizen engagement of 
global governance agencies. 
 
More coordinated relations 
 
As well as enhancing campaigner competence, a global civil society resource 
centre could also help to address a more general need for improved coordination 
in civil society activities vis-à-vis global governance. Many past citizen initiatives 
on issues of global regulation have seen their limited resources dissipated 
through fragmentation, duplication of efforts, and internecine competition. 
Moreover, many global policymakers have been reluctant to engage with what 
seems in their eyes to be a diffuse swarm of often ill-defined and poorly 
accountable civil society activities. These officials have therefore preferred to 
focus their relations with citizen associations on a restricted circle of well-known 
quantities, particularly major business lobbies and high-profile NGOs. Yet this 
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narrow approach has reinforced the problems of delegitimating exclusion 
emphasised earlier. 
 
Several initiatives have developed, especially over the past decade, to assemble 
civil society voices vis-à-vis global governance. For example, the Conference of 
Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative Relationship with the United 
Nations (CONGO, dating from 1948) and Social Watch (launched in 1995) have 
provided venues for civil society associations to congregate in relation to the UN 
system. The Montreal International Forum (started in 1998), the Bridge Initiative 
(begun in 2001) and the World Forum of Civil Society Networks-UBUNTU 
(formed in 2001) have sought to facilitate civil society coordination in respect of a 
wider range of multilateral institutions. The World Economic Forum (1971), 
CIVICUS-Worldwide Alliance for Citizen Participation (1993), the State of the 
World Forum (1995), and the World Social Forum (2001) have also constructed 
broad tents for civil society, albeit without seeking specifically to engage global 
governance agencies. 
 
Welcome though these efforts to foster more coordinated civil society 
engagement of global governance have been, they have generally suffered from 
some of the other shortcomings highlighted in the present analysis. Thus, for 
example, the initiatives have tended to limit their scope of ‘global governance’ to 
the most visible intergovernmental organisations, while overlooking 
transgovernmental networks and private global regulation as well as incipient 
interregionalism and translocalism. Moreover, with the exception of CONGO in 
relation to the UN, existing mechanisms to coordinate civil society activities on 
global governance have usually focused on the macro-level of major conferences 
and general policy frameworks, giving less attention to day-to-day processes of 
policy formulation and implementation. Furthermore, aside from the World Social 
Forum these initiatives have generally limited coverage of ‘global civil society’ to 
NGOs, and the more globally connected NGOs at that, thereby excluding large 
swathes of global citizen action in social movements and more locally based 
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associations. In addition, apart from the World Economic Forum most of these 
projects have worked with small and fragile resource bases. Nor – anticipating 
the next discussion point below – have these mechanisms for civil society 
coordination incorporated systematic processes to secure their accountability, 
either towards the participating civil society groups or towards constituencies in 
wider society. 
 
The challenge of nurturing more systematic civil society engagement of global 
governance therefore remains. On the one hand, efforts could be directed at 
improving existing coordination frameworks with wider coverage, greater 
inclusion, upgraded competence, higher resources, and greater accountability. 
On the other hand, new complementary venues could be developed with the 
specific purpose of coordinating civil society engagement of the full complex of 
global governance institutions (Scholte, 2007). 
 
More accountable engagement 
 
Finally among the five main prescriptions for future development put forward 
here, the potentials for civil society legitimation of global regulation can be 
furthered with increased accountability on the part of the citizen groups to their 
various constituencies. Constructive accountability dynamics can promote 
increased civil society relations with global governance agencies, since the 
authorities and the general public would then have more confidence in the bona 
fides of these citizen associations. At the same time, when pursued in a positive 
fashion, greater attention to accountability can prompt civil society groups to 
become more inclusive, competent and coordinated in their relations with 
transplanetary regimes. 
 
Civil society activities largely advance the legitimacy of global governance by 
making those regimes more accountable. With accountability, holders of power 
(in this case transplanetary regulatory authorities) are made answerable for the 
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ways that they use or fail to use that power, particularly when their actions and 
omissions result in harms. Civil society monitoring of the moral, legal, technical 
and democratic credentials of global governance has been one important way to 
promote the legitimacy of those regimes, particularly in the absence of strong 
formal oversight by parliaments and courts. In a watchdog function citizen groups 
endorse transplanetary regulatory agencies when these rulers perform well and 
call them to task when they fall short. In cases of failure, civil society circles may 
help to restore legitimacy to the global authorities by pressing for and obtaining 
restitution, for example, in the shape of apologies, policy changes, institutional 
reorganisations, staff reprimands, management resignations, reparations, and for 
particularly egregious abuses even incarcerations. 
 
Yet civil society watchdogs of global governance must also be accountable 
themselves. After all, the actions and omissions of civil society groups vis-à-vis 
transplanetary regulation can also do damage, including by the frequent 
shortfalls of inclusion, competence and coordination described above. In 
particularly bad cases, civil society organisations in global politics lack a clear 
public constituency, rarely if ever consult their supposed beneficiaries, fail to 
report on their activities, escape rigorous financial controls, and offer aggrieved 
parties no channels for complaint and redress. 
 
To correct such flaws in their own operations civil society associations require 
devices to ensure their own accountability – and through it their own legitimacy in 
exercising influence on global governance. The need for secure accountability on 
the part of actors in global civil society has been increasingly recognised of late, 
also by those actors themselves (Edwards, 2000; Chapman and Wameyo, 2001; 
Scholte, 2003: 87-94; Blagescu and Lloyd, 2006; Jordan and Van Tuijll, 2006; 
Ebrahim and Weisband, 2007: Part III). Less clear, however, is to whom these 
civil society groups should be accountable and by what means. 
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To be sure, certain important measures are already in place to foster the 
accountability of civil society associations in their engagement of global 
governance processes. For example, formal civil society organisations are 
usually registered under relevant national statutes and thereby become 
accountable to state authorities. In such cases the executive or the judiciary can 
curtail or disband civil society bodies that break the law. In addition, certain 
global governance agencies operate accreditation schemes to vet civil society 
associations that seek a formal consultative status. Meanwhile those civil society 
groups that have memberships and/or a board of governors are accountable to 
these supporters and may lose their backing in response to poor performance. 
Many civil society initiatives are also accountable (via project reports and 
financial statements) to donors that fund their work, with the sanction of losing 
vital monies in cases of immoral, illegal, incompetent or undemocratic conduct. 
Organisational accountability further exists to staff inasmuch as employees may 
blow whistles on misconduct or resign. Critical assessments of a given civil 
society association published in the mass media, academic research and 
consultancy reports can promote its accountability to the general public. 
Moreover, civil society organisations working in the area of global governance 
have promoted mutual accountability within their sector through the development 
of self-regulatory codes of conduct and other quality assurance schemes. A 
notable recent initiative in this regard is the INGO Accountability Charter 
inaugurated in 2006 (INGO, 2007). 
 
Yet arrangements to enhance the accountability of civil society activities in 
respect of global governance could be improved in three key respects. First, the 
credibility of the mechanisms just described depends in good part on the 
accountability in turn of the various monitors of civil society activities. Otherwise 
these controllers (be they governments, donors, mass media, academics or 
consultants) can abuse their power and use ‘accountability’ as a tool to suppress 
civil society. Every agent of accountability also needs in its turn to be sufficiently 
answerable for its actions on this subject. Thus constructive, effective and just 
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oversight is better obtained when the various social actors are enmeshed in 
complex networks of multilateral mutual accountability. To this end substantial 
future efforts could be devoted to furthering not only the answerability of civil 
society bodies to officials, funders, journalists, researchers and consultants, but 
also vice versa. 
 
A second major problem in existing accountability arrangements regarding civil 
society engagement of transplanetary governance is that they are heavily biased 
towards the powerful. Citizen group initiatives in global politics are mainly 
monitored by actors from elite quarters: donors, corporate media, academics, 
etc. In contrast, civil society work on global governance rarely includes 
systematic accountability to subordinated circles, even though it is often claimed 
that poor people and various minorities are major beneficiaries of civil society 
interventions in global regulation. Such asymmetric and undemocratic 
accountability reflects and reinforces the dynamics of marginalisation. When civil 
society associations are mainly made answerable to elites, accountability easily 
becomes part of hegemony rather than – as is often presumed – a way to resist it 
(Weisband and Ebrahim, 2007). Thus the future wants far more attention to ways 
that subordinated circles can obtain accountability from the powerful in civil 
society work on global governance issues. 
 
A third significant improvement in measures to obtain accountability in civil 
society campaigns on global governance could be had with reorientation from 
negative and blunt policing to positive and imaginative learning. Current oversight 
of global civil society is heavily geared toward bureaucratic surveillance and 
punishment in relation to externally imposed targets. Although controls against 
malfeasance are doubtless necessary, accountability exercises can and should 
also be a supportive process for reflective learning, with positive and creative 
initiatives to rethink visions, goals and the ways that they are pursued. Without 
such learning civil society organisations fail to correct their shortcomings and 
underachieve. Thus on the whole future practices of accountability in civil society 
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work concerning global governance need relatively less technocratic surveillance 
and relatively more organisational learning. 
 
Conclusion 
As the foregoing third part of this analysis has indicated, many challenges 
confront the enlargement and improvement of civil society engagement of global 
governance. To acquire greater consequence in the legitimation of global 
governance these relationships need substantial advances in terms of expanded 
proportions, enhanced inclusiveness, upgraded competence, raised coordination 
and improved accountability. Achieving these ends will take major efforts 
patiently sustained on multiple fronts over multiple years. 
 
These efforts will be worthwhile for the ample fruits that they can bear. As seen in 
the second part of this paper, civil society activities can do much to advance the 
legitimacy of global governance. Civil society interventions are not the only way 
to raise moral standards, legal bases, material delivery, democracy and 
charismatic leadership in transplanetary regulation. However, civil society offers 
some of the most substantial and immediately available possibilities in this 
regard. 
 
To neglect these potentials would be to lose one of the best opportunities to 
address one of the most pressing needs in contemporary politics, namely, to 
raise the legitimacy of global governance and thereby to facilitate its growth. The 
more global world of the twenty-first century needs major elements of effective 
and just global governance. A large scale of inclusive, competent, systematic, 
accountable global civil society activity is a vital vehicle to that destination. 
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